US cold war foreign policy Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1250 words

US cold war foreign insurance policy - Essay ExampleWhen the Berlin Wall started to fall in November 1989, it represented the beginning of the end of a roughly 45 year conflict. All over Eastern Europe, millions of people cried out for freedom. Within two years, the Soviet Union dissolved and so too had the Cold War.Many in the West called this a victory with some praising U.S. President Ronald Reagan and his aggressive, military policy towards the Soviet Union. Francis Fukuyama called it the end of history.1 Others looked to the future with U.S. President George H. W.Bush speaking close to a new existence order.2 Yet, the absolute victory Fukuyama spoke of is mis becomeing. Bushs vision of the future is tainted by new elements, Osama salt away Laden, that are directly linked to the policies of the Cold War. To come across our Cold War policies and their effects requires us to poke into some of the earliest documents of this conflict. This includes George Kennans Long Telegra m and his Mr. X article as well as Walter Lippmans response. NSC-68 and The grievous American will also be analyzed. Together, these documents provide the necessary foundation from which to much completely understand how the Cold War ended and why.When Germany surrendered on May 7, 1945, it ended World War II flake in Europe. Almost immediately, though, the Soviet Union and the coupled States of America started to establish radically different policies in respect to recently liberated European counties. By 1946, tension between the former war assort started to mount. George Kennan, a member of the U.S. State Department stationed in Moscow, wrote a letter to Secretary of State jam Byrnes describing the Soviet Union and her ambitions in the midst of this tension. In his Long Telegram, Kennan argues that the Kremlins neurotic view of world affairs is traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity.3 Kennan separates the Russian people from the ruling class, and, more impo rtantly, finds complexity in the policy positions of the Soviet Union. Further, while the Soviet Union is insecure, Kennan believes that the Soviet Union thinks easily in respect to international conflicts and internal stability is of particular importance to the regime. Accordingly, Kennan suggests that the United States should engage the Soviet Union on many fronts diplomatic, economic and military. Kennan finishes the telegram with a note of caution the greatest peril that can befall us in coping with this problem of Soviet communism is that we shall allow ourselves to arrive like those with whom we are coping.4In 1947, Kennan wrote an article for Foreign Affairs under the name Mr. X. In The Sources of Soviet Conduct, Kennan offers a more compact version of the Long Telegram. Kennan argues that the United State must lead the fight against the Soviet Union. However, he only uses the words military and conflict once and argues that the United States should apply a cautious, persi stent closet toward the disruption and, weakening of all rival influence and rival occasion.5 Further, Kennan notes that the United States has it in its power to increase enormously the strains under which Soviet policy must operate.6 This, though, did not mean entirely military engagement. Walter Lippman responded by arguing that the United States should concentrate our effort on treaties of peace which would end the melodic line of Europe.7 Unlike Kennan, Lippman believed that recent Soviet actions demonstrated that it was a much more violent country, prone to aggressive international behavior. Accordingly, Lippman took a more militaristic stance again the Soviet Union and the plan of containment.Then, in 1950, the U.S. policy towards the Soviet Union was more officially codified in NSC 68 United States Objectives and Programs for National Security. While using Kennan as a starting point, the document leans more towards Lippmans conception of the Soviet threat and has a more militaristic response. NSC-68 argues for a rapid and concerted build-up of the actual strength of